Competence, Safety and Situation in Virtue Reliabilism

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.32916

Keywords:

Virtue Epistemology, Reliabilism, Competence, Epistemic Virtue, Safety Condition

Abstract

This paper presents the debate between two types of virtue reliabilists: robust reliabilists, who envision knowledge as apt belief resulting from the manifestation of the epistemic agent’s reliable cognitive competences, and modest or anti-luck reliabilists, who argue that, in addition to competence, apt belief requires an additional condition, which they identify as the safety condition. After presenting the terms of the debate, an argument is put forth to reject modest reliabilism: the safety condition is already embedded in two fundamental aspects assumed in the concept of competence inherent to robust reliabilism through its situational condition, rendering the safety condition somewhat trivial.

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References

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Published

2025-04-21

How to Cite

Pino, D. (2025). Competence, Safety and Situation in Virtue Reliabilism. Teorema. International Journal of Philosophy, 44(1). https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.32916

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