A Transcendental Approach to Dream Skepticism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.32695Keywords:
Dream Skepticism, Transcendental Philosophy, Descartes, Kant, PutnamAbstract
How can we know we are not dreaming? In this essay, I tackle this and related questions from a transcendental standpoint, by building a philosophical narrative centred upon three “giants”: Descartes, Kant, and Putnam. From each, I take some ideas and discard some others, with the aim of developing a historically informed, yet original, transcendental approach to dream scepticism. I argue that dreams can be distinguished from objective cognitions, since they do not regularly fulfil the transcendental conditions of such cognitions, e.g. the conditions of linguistic reference. Indeed, drawing on some insights by G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein, I further argue that the formulations of dream skepticism prove nonsensical: they cannot be linguistically understood. However, reflection on these skeptical formulations may lead us to a clear aesthetic understanding of the transcendental conditions of sense, as well as of the meaning of philosophically problematic words like “dream,” “perception,” and “reality.”
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