A Transcendental Approach to Dream Skepticism
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https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.32695Palabras clave:
escepticismo sobre los sueños, filosofía trascendental, Descartes, Kant, PutnamResumen
¿Cómo podemos saber que no estamos soñando? En este ensayo, abordo ésta y otras cuestiones relacionadas desde un punto de vista trascendental, construyendo una narrativa filosófica centrada en tres “gigantes”: Descartes, Kant y Putnam. De cada uno de ellos tomo algunas ideas y descarto otras, con el fin de desarrollar un enfoque trascendental históricamente informado, aunque original, del escepticismo sobre los sueños. Sostengo que estos pueden distinguirse de las cogniciones objetivas, ya que no suelen cumplir las condiciones trascendentales de tales cogniciones, por ejemplo, las condiciones de la referencia lingüística. De hecho, basándome en algunas ideas de G. E. Moore y Wittgenstein, sostengo además que las formulaciones del escepticismo onírico resultan carentes de sentido: no pueden comprenderse lingüísticamente. Sin embargo, la reflexión sobre estas formulaciones escépticas puede llevarnos a una clara comprensión estética de las condiciones trascendentales del sentido, así como del significado de palabras filosóficamente problemáticas como “sueño”, “percepción” y “realidad”.
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Derechos de autor 2025 Simone Nota
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