TEOLOGÍA NOMINALISTA Y RACIONALIDAD ILUSTRADA. LOS PRESUPUESTOS OCKHAMIANOS DE LA FILOSOFÍA DEL DERECHO KANTIANA

Abstract

The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate a series of connections in terms of concepts and subjects between Ockham and Kant’s philosophical models that may provide a comprehensive framework for their respective insights on Law. Our main thesis postulates the existence of a continuum of certain fundamental assumptions derived from Nominalist theology and enlightened rationality that contribute to the essential unity of so-called “modern thought” and how such continuity is projected in the legal domain. In this sense, we suggest the need to reflect upon the tacit Nominalism underlying Kantian criticism, which, although devoid of all theological premises, reconstructs metaphysics while preserving its basic scheme. In order to do so, our starting point is a very brief reference to the similarities between their respective theories of knowledge. We go on to analyze the structure behind moral actions according to Ockham and Kant’s doctrines. Finally, we point to certain founding principles and elements common to both doctrines in the field of legal-political thought.