DERECHO, NEUROCIENCIA Y NEURODERECHO. UN ALEGATO A FAVOR DEL MÉTODO SOCRÁTICO

Iván Daldoss

doi:10.30827/acfs.v57i.25235

Autores/as

Iván Daldoss

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.30827/acfs.v57i.25235

Palabras clave:

Neurociencia, Neuroderecho, Debate, Método socrático

Resumen

Este trabajo se centra en la creciente interacción entre la neurociencia y el derecho, delineando cuestiones de responsabilidad penal y en el marco más amplio de las interacciones epistemológicas entre diferentes campos del conocimiento. Ilustra la oportunidad de mantener un “debate” o diálogo peculiar entre las ramas de la ciencia consideradas y en el ámbito particular del neuroderecho. A continuación, el artículo presenta el método socrático como un enfoque dialéctico específico para orientar racionalmente estas conexiones epistemológicas, favorecer la comparación crítica de perspectivas heterogéneas y, por tanto, poner de manifiesto espacios comunes fértiles en los que es posible alcanzar nuevos conocimientos interdisciplinarios. Por último, el artículo considera posturas significativas en el debate sobre el neuroderecho para mostrar que, en la medida en que se basan en la dialéctica y la refutación, pueden considerarse como fuertes manifestaciones de un diálogo socrático. Por lo tanto, aprovechando esta práctica, incluso en los sistemas
jurídicos hay espacio para las pruebas y las aportaciones neurocientíficas, aunque esto conlleve una pizca de “neuromodestia”, pensamiento crítico y una defensa del método socrático.

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