How to Build an Epistemic Echo Chamber
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.34113Palabras clave:
cámaras de eco, grupos epistémicos, equilibrios subóptimos, teorema del jurado de CondorcetResumen
El presente artículo ofrece un modelo explicativo de la estructura lógica de las cámaras de eco epistémicas. La mayoría de los trabajos realizados hasta la fecha sobre cámaras de eco atribuyen su causa a vicios epistémicos: surgen debido a un razonamiento deficiente o sesgos cognitivos. Argumento que, en cambio, son un resultado predecible de la formación racional de creencias. Resultan de la agregación y amplificación de las creencias de sus miembros por parte de los grupos, y de la repercusión del consenso grupal en los individuos, quienes aumentan su confianza para integrarse mejor en el grupo. Este proceso es recursivo, impulsando tanto a los individuos como a los grupos epistémicos a una convicción completa. También argumento que no todas las cámaras de eco son malas. Son virtuosas cuando aumentan la credibilidad en la verdad de quienes las componen y las protegen contra las falsedades, los datos corruptos y el razonamiento falaz externo. Las cámaras de eco son malas cuando parten de falsedades y amplifican la confianza en ellas.
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Derechos de autor 2025 Steven Hales
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.
