Is There a Possible World in which Imagining Zombies Can Shed Light on Our Understanding of Consciousness?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.32734Palabras clave:
conciencia, zombis, fisicalismo, reduccionismo, argumentos modalesResumen
En este artículo critico el reduccionismo explicativo que subyace al argumento zombi desde el punto de vista de la filosofía de la ciencia. Defiendo que se trata de una tesis que no encuentra sustento en los modelos disponibles de reducción, una tesis que está basada en una idealización infundada de las ciencias naturales y que depende de una incierta apelación a la posibilidad en principio de una futura física unificada. Concluyo que el carácter incierto de estos supuestos invita a una reconsideración no sólo de las implicaciones de este tipo de argumentos para el naturalismo metodológico, sino también del papel que los mismos desempeñan en el estudio de la conciencia.
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