Instituciones y costos de transacción

Julia Barragán

doi:10.30827/acfs.v50i0.5174

Authors

Julia Barragán Universidad Central de Venezuela

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.30827/acfs.v50i0.5174

Keywords:

negotiation, institutional arrangement, prisoner’s dilemma, strategic rationality, partiality, sanction, authority, social capital, restricted maximization, rules of the game

Abstract

The main task of the institutional arrangements is to make the transaction costs as inexpensive as posible. In order to reach this goal the institution-designers try to maintain social behaviour under external control the by using optimal-incentives systems. We intend to show two main issues; on the one hand, that the construction of the “internal point of view” contributes to making the transaction costs less expensive, and on the other hand, that the value messages of the normative authority plays a crucial role in the emergence of the internal point of view.

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