MAJORITY RULE, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL EQUALITY

Abstract

The  conflict  between  aggregative  democracy  (based  on the egalitarian  value  of the majority  rule)  and  deliberative  (focused  on the epistemic  force  of the better  argument), is  one of the main tensions of contemporary  theory of democracy. This paper argues that those who def ine the conflict  convert  it from an over-optimistic  view of the moral value of the  first  and  a too  pessimistic  view  of the  not  egalitarian  nature  of the  second.  The connection  of majority  rule with political equality would not be so strong and exclusive, and deliberation a process not only controllable by the unbiased search for correct political solutions  and not by the demands  of procedural  justice.  However,  although  with far less exaggerated proportions than has been suggested, there would be a degree of incompatibility between the two procedures that could be, if not completely overcome, at least relaxed to  admit that any justif ication for a decision-making  procedure  cannot be developed  in a completely  abstract way, but has to be adjusted to the context.