Silent rifles? Criminal agendas and paramilitary demobilization in Colombia under the Peace Triangle

Abstract

How do criminal agendas affect a peace process with violent non-state actors? This article attempts to resolve this question by presenting a qualitative analysis of the demobilization process of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) during the government of Alvaro Uribe using the Peace Triangle as an analytical framework, based on three study variables: issues, behavior and attitudes.The review from this model aims to make a double contribution to peace studies. On the one hand, it fills a gap in academic knowledge about the sustainability of peace processes. And, on the other, to examine the relationship between criminal agendas and conflict resolution. The research reveals that the former Colombian President's inadequate management of criminal agendas transformed the peace negotiation into a damage control strategy since it did not intend to modify the scale of predatory crimes committed by the AUC, but rather to shape its behavior