Undetermined: Free will in real time and through time
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.34308Palabras clave:
toma de decisiones, juicio, control, responsabilidad, carácterResumen
En su libro Determined, Robert Sapolsky sostiene que nuestros sistemas cognitivos son efectivamente deterministas, de modo que un algoritmo preconfigurado inevitablemente arrojará una única respuesta sobre qué hacer en cada escenario que enfrentamos, sin dejar nada en ese proceso que “dependa de nosotros”. Una visión más realista de la psicología y la neurociencia de la toma de decisiones cuestiona esta impresión determinista y resalta, en cambio, cómo nuestros procesos cognitivos están diseñados para “ajustar el algoritmo” sobre la marcha, precisamente para que podamos averiguar qué hacer en escenarios novedosos donde todas las relaciones contextuales no podrían haber sido preestablecidas. Llevar a cabo estos procesos cognitivos — operando sobre patrones significativos de actividad neuronal, evaluando la saliencia relativa de diversos parámetros, de manera altamente contextual y holística, por razones personales, lo mejor que podemos con información incompleta y componentes ruidosos — es precisamente nosotros decidiendo qué hacer. Esto también debilita el argumento de que no tenemos control sobre cómo se configuran nuestros sistemas neuronales o cognitivos en un momento dado. Algunas de las decisiones que tomamos son sobre nuestra propia cognición y motivaciones: moldeamos nuestro carácter a lo largo del tiempo de maneras que nos permiten actuar como nosotros mismos en tiempo real.
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Derechos de autor 2025 Kevin Mitchell
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