Populismo autoritario y Derecho Internacional
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30827/acfs.v60i.33618Palabras clave:
populismo, autoritarismo, nacionalismo, Derecho Internacional, fuentes del derechoResumen
El artículo aborda la relación entre los populismos nacionalistas y autoritarios, ahora en auge, y el Derecho Internacional. Se argumenta que estos movimientos no rechazan el Derecho Internacional en sí mismo, sino que promueven un Derecho Internacional que coloca en el centro la idea de soberanía estatal, enfatizando el rol del consentimiento de los Estados en la formación de las normas jurídicas. La justificación de esta opción pretende ser democrática: dado que el líder populista es el verdadero representante del pueblo, sólo los acuerdos que él consienta se reputarán consentidos por el pueblo. Por otra parte, y consecuentemente, los populismos nacionalistas y autoritarios no se oponen necesariamente a los tratados multilaterales, aunque sí manifiestan reticencias a los regímenes que esos tratados pueden crear y que implican la delegación de soberanía en instancias supranacionales.
Descargas
Citas
Aleinikoff, T. A. (2004). Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution. Texas Law Review, 82, 1989-2154.
Alter, K. J. (2021). From colonial to multilateral international law: A global capitalism and law investigation. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 19(3), 798-864.
Alterio, A. M. (2013). El constitucionalismo popular y el populismo constitucional como categorías constitucionales. En M. Alterio y R. Niem¬bro Ortega. Constitucionalismo popular en Latinoamérica (pp. 63-94). México: Porrúa.
Alvarez, J. (2000). Multilateralism and Its Discontents. European Journal of International Law, 11(2), 393-411.
Andholtz, W., Bei, Y. y Caldwell, K. (2020). Backlash and International Human Rights Courts. En A. Brysk y M. Stohl (eds.). Contracting Human Rights: Crisis, Accountability, and Opportunity (pp. 159-178). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Arlettaz, F. (2024). Tres tesis sobre el populismo y el internacionalismo de los derechos humanos. En M. J. González Ordovás. Los límites del derecho. Ocho reflexiones sobre algunas limitaciones del derecho (pp. 231-272). Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
Aust, A. (2010). Handbook of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baléo, M. (2020). Hervé Juvin, l’artisan de la nouvelle doctrine du rassemblement national. Le Grand Continent, 26 de junio de 2020, https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2020/06/26/herve-juvin-lartisan-de-la-nouvelle-doctrine-du-rassemblement-national/.
Besson S. (2016). State Consent and Disagreement in International Law-Making. Dissolving the Paradox. Leiden Journal of International Law, 29(2), 289-316.
Bolton, J. (2010). How Barack Obama is Endangering our National Sovereignty. Nueva York: Encounter Books.
Bolton, J. (2017). Trump, Trade and American Sovereignty, The Wall Street Journal, 7 de marzo de 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-trade-and-american-sovereignty-1488931180.
Brunée, J. (2018). Multilateralism in crisis. Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting, 112, 335-339.
Cassese, A. (1986). International Law in a Divided World. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Christiano, T. (2010). Democratic legitimacy and international institutions. En S. Besson y J. Tasioulas. The Philosophy of International Law. New York: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, J. y Newman, J. (2017). ‘People in this country have had enough of experts’: Brexit and the paradoxes of populism. Critical Policy Studies, 11(1), 101-116.
Cohen, H. G. (2018). Multilateralism’s Life Cycle. American Journal of International Law, 112, 47-66.
Corbett, S. (2016). The Social Consequences of Brexit for the UK and Europe: Euroscepticism, Populism, Nationalism, and Societal Division. International Journal of Social Quality, 6(1), 11-31.
Crespy, A. y Verschueren, N. (2009). From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 10(3), 377-393.
Crossley, N. (2008). Multilateralism Versus Unilateralism. Londres: Peter Lang.
De Nadal, L. (2021). Spain’s VOX party and the threat of ‘international environmental populism’. Open Democracy, 9 de agosto de 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/spains-vox-party-and-the-threat-of-international-environmental-populism/.
De Vries, C. y van Kersbergen, K. (2007). Interests, identity and political allegiance in the European Union. Acta Politica, 42(2), 307-328.
Donnelly, Jack (2005). Realism. En Scott Burchill et al. (eds.). Theories of International Relations (pp. 29-54). Londres: Palgrave.
Fastenrath, U., Geiger, R., Khan, D.-E., Paulus, A., von Schorlemer, S. y Vedder, C. (eds., 2011). From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fichtelberg, A. (2018). Populist Paranoia and International Law. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 49, 45-67.
Frei, R. y Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2008). El populismo como experimento político: Historia y teoría política de una ambivalencia. Revista de Sociología, 22, 117-140.
Friedman, A. J. (2025). Cut International Law Down to Size: National Sovereignty Trumps Utopian Alternatives. The Federalist Society blog, 14 de enero de 2025, https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/cut-international-law-down-to-size-national-sovereignty-trumps-utopian-alternatives.
Ginsburg, T. (2020). Authoritarian International Law? American Journal of International Law, 114(2), 221-260.
Giusti, S. (2022). National Interest and Brexit. En S. Giusti. The Fall and Rise of National Interest (pp. 87-106). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Goldsmith, J. (2017). The Trump Onslaught on International Law and Institutions. Lawfare, 17 de marzo de 2017, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-onslaught-international-law-and-institutions.
Groves, S., Schaefer, B. y Loris, N. (2016). The U.S. Should Withdraw from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Heritage Foundation Report, https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/the-us-should-withdraw-the-united-nations-framework-convention-climate-change.
Gruszczynski, L. y Lawrence, J. (2018). Trump, International Trade and Populism. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 2018, 19-44.
Guzmán, A. (2012). Against Consent. Virginia Journal of International Law, 52(4), 747-790.
Harmsen, R. y Spiering, M. (2004). Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Hawkins, K. A. y Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). The Ideational Approach to Populism. Latin American Research Review, 52(4), 513-528.
Henkin, L. (1989). International Law: Politics. Values, and Functions. Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International, 216.
Hill, P. (2015). Selective sovereignty: UKIP and the independence of Britain. Open Democracy, 30 de abril de 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/selective-sovereignty-ukip-and-independence-of-britain/.
Hollis, D. (2005). Why Consent Still Matters. Non-¬State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law. Berkeley Journal of International Law, 23.
Kassoti, E. (2016). Beyond State Consent? International Legal Scholarship and the Challenge of Informal International Law-Making. Netherlands International Law Review, 63, 99-131.
Kelsen, H. (1952). Principles of International Law. Nueva York: Rinehart and Company.
Koh, H. (2017). Trump Administration and International Law. Washburn Law Journal, 56, 413-459.
Koh, H. (205). National Security Resilience and Reform: Trump 2.0 and Beyond. Just Security, 8 de enero de 2025, https://www.justsecurity.org/106146/national-security-resilience-reform/.
Ku, J. y Yoo, J. (2012). Taming Globalization: International Law, the U.S. Constitution, and the New World Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koskenniemi, M. (1995). International Law in a Post-Realist Era. American Yearbook of International Law, 16, 1-19.
Koskenniemi, M. (2000). General Principles: Reflexions on Constructivist Thinking in International Law. En M. Koskenniemi (ed.). Sources of International Law. Londres: Routledge.
Koskenniemi, M. (2007). The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. The Modern Law Review, 70(1), 1-30.
Krisch, N. (2014). The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods. American Journal of International Law, 108(1), 1-40.
Leruth, B., Startin, N. y Usherwood, S. (2018). The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism, Londres: Routledge.
Lindsay, J. M. (2024). Transition 2025: Donald Trump Sets His Sights on Canada, Greenland, and the Panama Canal. Council on Foreign Relations, 27 de diciembre de 2024, https://www.cfr.org/blog/transition-2025-donald-trump-sets-his-sights-canada-greenland-and-panama-canal.
Loris, N. y Schaefer, B. (2017). Withdraw from Paris by Withdrawing from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Heritage Foundation Report, https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/withdraw-paris-withdrawing-the-un-framework-convention-climate-change.
Madsen, M. R., Cebulak, P. y Wiebusch, M. (2018). Backlash against International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts. International Journal of Law in Context, 14(2), 197–220.
Marks, S. (1997). The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses. European Journal of International Law, 8, 449-477.
Mcginnis, J. (2003). The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO. Virginia Journal of International Law, 44, 229-284.
Moyn, S. (2018). Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mudde, C. y Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2013). Populism. En M. Freeden y M. Stears (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies (pp. 493-512). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nye, J. (1999). Redefining the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, 78(4), 22-35.
Oppenheim, L. (1905). International Law. A treatise. Londres: Longmans and Co.
Orrego Vicuña, F. (2004). Creación del derecho en una sociedad global: ¿Importa todavía el consentimiento? Estudios Internacionales, 37(146), 81-103.
Panizza, F. (2009). Introducción. En F. Panizza (comp.). El populismo como espejo de la democracia (pp. 9-50). México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Peruzzotti, E. (2008). Populismo y representación democrática. En C. de la Torre y E. Peruzzotti (eds.). El retorno del pueblo. El populismo y nuevas democracias en América Latina. Quito: Flacso.
Peters, A. (2005). Global Constitutionalism Revisited. International Legal Theory, 11.
Posner, E. A. (2009). The Perils of Global Legalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Posner, E. A. (2017). Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash. University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Paper Series, 606.
Rabkin, J. (1999). International Law vs. the American Constitution. Something’s Got To Give. The National Interest, 55, 30-41.
Rabkin, J. (2009). The Constitution and American Sovereignty. Imprimis, 38 (7/8).
Reich, A. (2010). Bilateralism versus multilateralism in international economic law: applying the principle of subsidiarity. University of Toronto Law Journal, 60(2), 263-287.
Ruggie, J. (1992). Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution. International Organization, 46, 1992, 561-598.
Schaller, S. y Carius, A. (2019). Convenient Truths: Mapping climate agendas of right-wing populist parties in Europe. Berlin: Adelphi.
Schwöbel-Patel, C. (2018). Populism, International Law and the End of Keep Calm and Carry on Lawyering. Netherlands yearbook of international law, 49, 97-121.
Slobodian, Q. (2018). Populists are also globalists. New York Times, 23 de octubre de 2018.
Szczerbiak, A. y Taggart, P. (2003). Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality. SEI Working Paper, 69.
Taggart, P. (1998). A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33(3), 363-388.
Taggart, P. y Szczerbiak, A. (2001). Parties, positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe. OERN Working Paper, 2.
Usherwood, S. y Startin, N. (2013). Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), 1-16.
Viotti, P. R. y Kauppi, M. V. (2012). International Relations Theory. Glenview: Longman-Pearson.
Voeten, E. (2020). Populism and Backlashes against International Courts. Perspectives on Politics, 18(2), 407-422. S
Watson, J. S. (1992). State Consent and the Sources of International Obligation. Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting, 86, 108-113.
Zente, Z. (2024). Too Little, Too Late: Four Reasons Why EU Sanctions against Hungary Do Not Work. VerfBlog, 2024/1/26, https://verfassungsblog.de/too-little-too-late-3/.
Descargas
Publicado
Cómo citar
Número
Sección
Licencia
Derechos de autor 2026 Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.
Los nombres y direcciones de correo-e introducidos en esta revista se usarán exclusivamente para los fines declarados por esta revista y no estarán disponibles para ningún otro propósito u otra persona.
Los autores y autoras poseen los derechos sobre sus trabajos. Los ACFS ruegan que se haga constar la publicación en los mismos si aparecieran con posterioridad en otro medio.
