Rawls, el derecho y el hecho del pluralismo

Autores/as

  • José Juan Moreso Mateos Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.30827/acfs.v55i0.15467

Palabras clave:

John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, razonamiento jurídico, razón pública, principios de nivel medio.

Resumen

RESUMEN

En este trabajo se analizan las principales ideas de John Rawls acerca de la naturaleza del derecho y del razonamiento jurídico. Partiendo de un trabajo de Ronald Dworkin (2004), y básicamente de acuerdo con él, se exponen las críticas dworkinianas a la doctrina rawlsiana de la razón pública, y se presenta un modo en el cual Rawls podría replicarlas. El objetivo del trabajo es mostrar la fecundidad de las ideas rawlsianas para nuestra concepción del derecho en sociedades democráticas, caracterizadas por el hecho del pluralismo.

 

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Biografía del autor/a

José Juan Moreso Mateos, Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona

J.J. Moreso

Catedrático de Filosofía del Derecho

Departamento de Derecho

Universidad Pompeu Fabra

Barcelona

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Publicado

2020-12-22

Cómo citar

Moreso Mateos, J. J. (2020). Rawls, el derecho y el hecho del pluralismo. Anales De La Cátedra Francisco Suárez, 55, 49–74. https://doi.org/10.30827/acfs.v55i0.15467